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Book Review

Frontline Justice: The Evolution
and Reform of Summary Trials in
the Canadian Armed Forces by
Pascal Lévesque1
DAVID GALVIN HEPPENSTALL2
THE SECURITY OF CANADA and the safety of its inhabitants depend on the

readiness of the Armed Forces.3 To maintain this readiness, service members are
subject to special disciplinary standards and penal processes that ordinary courts
are ill-suited to handle.4 A separate military justice system—which exists parallel
to the civilian criminal justice system—imposes these distinct standards and
enforces swift, stern discipline.5
The overwhelming majority of disciplinary offences in the military are
processed at summary trials: miniature criminal trials for minor offences.6 The
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

(McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) [Frontline Justice].
Juris Doctor 2021, Osgoode Hall Law School. This article is dedicated to my grandfather,
Chief Warrant Officer Gerald Raymond Heppenstall CD (1922-1995), whose career with
the Canadian Army would last for over thirty-seven years.
See R v Généreux, [1992] 1 SCR 259 at para 60 [Généreux].
Ibid. See also Lévesque, supra note 1 at 11-13.
See ibid at 16; Généreux, supra note 3 at paras 60, 62; Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online),
Military, “Overview: Regulatory Framework: Statutes: National Defence Act” (I.1.(2).(a)) at
HMI-2 “National Defence Act overview,” (2019 Reissue); CED 4th (online), Military Law,
“Military Law: Military Law Defined” (I.1) at §2.
See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 9, 49, 54; Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual
Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Minister of National Defence on the Administration
of Military Justice from 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019, by Geneviève Bernatchez, Catalogue
No D1-16 (DND, 2019) at 14.
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essence of these proceedings has remained unchanged over time; they provide
prompt, fair justice to maintain the discipline of the troops with flexibility.7
At a summary trial, the focus is on facts, not law.8 Accordingly, to curtail legal
debate, there are no lawyers present—not even legal counsel for the accused.9
Further, the decision maker is not an independent military judge but a presiding
officer who also participates in the fact-finding.10 No transcript is kept, and no
written reasons are required.11 If found guilty, the accused could face “true penal
consequences,” including detention and a criminal record.12
In Frontline Justice: The Evolution and Reform of Summary Trials in the
Canadian Armed Forces (“Frontline Justice”), Pascal Lévesque, former member
of the Armed Forces who served as a legal officer for fifteen years, argues for
reform.13 While civilian summary justice has progressively evolved to better
protect human rights, military summary justice has not evolved in the same
way.14 The military may have a greater concern for discipline, but Lévesque is
concerned that summary proceedings breach the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.15
Further, he argues that military summary justice has been isolated from oversight
and kept apart from judicial actors; in 2018, the Auditor General of Canada
“found that the Office of the Judge Advocate General did not review or study the
summary trial processes in the last 10 years,” possibly to avoid learning that the
system does indeed breach the Charter.16 Lévesque posits that, while the rights of
service members are being illegitimately restricted, the summary trial system has
remained overlooked and unchallenged.17
Military law is a highly specialized discipline. Constitutional challenges
are rare, general knowledge is low, and the path to reform is steep. With few
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 43, 136; Canada, Department of National Defence,
Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, vol 2 (DND, 3 July 2019),
art 108.02 [QR&O].
See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 50.
However, the accused is entitled to a minimally qualified “assisting officer” who takes a
“limited role” in the process. Ibid at 46-47, 54, 97-98.
Ibid at 50, 73-74.
Ibid at 51, 82.
Ibid at 63, 66, 90, 102.
Ibid at 10.
Ibid at 33, 43, 182.
Ibid at 43, 69. See Généreux, supra note 3 at para 162; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Lévesque, supra note 1 at 54-55, 182; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report 3—
Administration of Justice in the Canadian Armed Forces (OAG, 2018) at para 3.75.
Lévesque, supra note 1 at 31, 57.
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exceptions, individual service members convicted at a summary trial are unlikely
to launch constitutional challenges due to the time, cost, and general unwillingness
to be “perceived as troublemakers” in their tightly knit military community.18
Further, there are few lawyers with the necessary expertise to effectively convey
military law to a civilian judge.19 There are also only a few specialists, scholars,
and public officials with the necessary background to contribute meaningfully to
the dialogue on reform.20 Finally, the average Canadian’s knowledge of military
affairs is limited and often informed inaccurately by popular culture (e.g., by JAG
or A Few Good Men).21 Lévesque suggests that this shallow pool of knowledge
makes it more likely for reforms to be based on emotion rather than reason.22
To make the case for objective reforms, Lévesque aims to educate an ambitiously
wide audience—from military law scholars to the general public.23
Frontline Justice is an important contribution to Canadian legal literature.
When military law is compared to other legal fields, “literature is scarce.”24
At best, academic consideration has been described by the Supreme Court of
Canada—in the words of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé—as “not abundant.”25 In fact,
one commentator, Professor Andrew Flavelle Martin, observed that the literature
“virtually ignore[s]” military lawyers (i.e., legal officers like Lévesque).26 With
Frontline Justice, Lévesque successfully closes a significant gap. He makes few
assumptions and provides the reader with an accessible, detailed description
of the mechanisms of the summary trial system together with a historical
account of its origins and how it has responded to change over time.27 This solid
footing allows him to articulate and defend a clear analysis of how that system
breaches the Charter.28
Frontline Justice is timely. Lévesque’s contribution to the literature is arriving
at a moment when Parliament has recently enacted new legislation to reform the
military justice system.29 It is also coming immediately prior to an independent
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ibid at 57, 75.
Ibid at 57.
Ibid at 151.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 10-11, 151.
Ibid at 21.
Généreux, supra note 3 at para 159.
“Legal Ethics and Canada’s Military Lawyers” (2019) 97 Can Bar Rev 100 at 101.
See “A Description of the Summary Trial” in Lévesque, supra note 1, 32.
“Charter Breaches” in ibid, 56; “Reasonably Available Alternatives” in ibid, 111; “Can
Breaches Be Demonstrably Justified under Section 1?” in ibid, 132.
29. Ibid at 154-55.
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review of the military justice system. In 2020, Justice Fish, retired judge of
the Supreme Court of Canada, was appointed as the Independent Review
Authority.30 At the time Frontline Justice was written, the legislation had not yet
passed. The government’s latest attempt at reform, Bill C-77, was still making its
way through Parliament.31 In tandem with proposing a new model for military
justice, Lévesque critically engages with the then-proposed legislation, identifies
shortcomings, and advocates for options for reform.32 Today, Bill C-77 is law, and
Lévesque’s recommendations remain relevant in charting the next path forward
“to evolve the system so it reflects current Canadian values.”33
To explain the function of military justice, Lévesque takes the reader
on a guided tour of the summary trial system from the bottom to the top.
To accomplish this, he uses second-person narrative to put the reader in a variety
of situations. At the outset, the reader becomes different service members facing
penal consequences.34 Next, the reader becomes a unit legal advisor providing
counsel to the presiding officer of a summary trial.35 As lawyers are not present
at summary trials, the reader’s perspective is limited to being on the receiving
end of a telephone call. These narratives contextualize legal concepts, but, most
importantly, these authentic experiences of military life effectively orient and
engage the reader.
Lévesque also uses second-person narrative to frame the function of military
justice within the broader notion of military discipline.36 For example, in one
vivid account, you are engaging in routine base activities when, suddenly, sirens
blare, and mortal danger is imminent. You escape peril—barely evading a
rocket-propelled grenade—as a direct result of your training and self-discipline.37
With this vignette, Lévesque masterfully hammers home the crucial importance
of military discipline. In sum, his use of second-person narrative successfully
30. See Department of National Defence, News Release, “Minister of National Defence
appoints the Independent Review Authority to conduct the Third Independent Review
of the National Defence Act” (16 November 2020), online: <www.canada.ca/en/
department-national-defence/news/2020/11/minister-of-national-defence-appoints-theindependent-review-authority-to-conduct-the-third-independent-review-of-the-nationaldefence-act.html> [Independent Review]. See also National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5.
31. An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make related and consequential amendments to
other Acts, SC 2019 (1st Sess), c 15 (assented to 21 June 2019).
32. Supra note 1 at 28; “Reform Proposals” in ibid, 150.
33. Independent Review, supra note 30.
34. Lévesque, supra note 1 at 3-8.
35. Ibid at 32-33.
36. Ibid at 16.
37. Ibid at 18.
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educates the reader about the purpose of military discipline while also situating
the function of military justice in a realistic context.
To describe the legal foundation of military justice, Lévesque starts at
the beginning: the Middle Ages. In medieval England, there was no standing
army; instead, feudal armies were raised for individual conflicts.38 The rules
for each conflict—including disciplinary matters—were laid down in Articles
of War, regulations that would persist only for the duration of the conflict.39
In the wake of the English Revolution in 1688, a standing army was situated
“equably between the Crown and Parliament” to resolve long-standing tensions
and prevent divided loyalties.40 In doing so, a legislative function was granted
to Parliament, and disciplinary power was granted to the Crown.41 With the
growth of the “profession of arms,” it became necessary to provide the Crown
with robust powers to enforce discipline.42 Such powers were enshrined in the
1689 Mutiny Act, which created a new legal distinction between soldiers and
ordinary subjects.43 This is the origin of military law.
Grounded in this historical perspective, Lévesque describes the modern
Canadian military justice system. The National Defence Act outlines the Code
of Service Discipline, which is binding upon all service members (i.e., officers
and non-commissioned members of the regular, special, and reserve forces).44
A service member accused of breaching the Code is tried at one of two procedural
levels: court martial or summary trial. For the most serious offences, trial is by
formal court martial.45 In contrast, for the five least serious breaches, the matter

38. Ibid at 33.
39. Ibid.
40. Charles M Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown; Their Administration and Government, vol
1 (John Murray, 1869) at 16, 83-84 [emphasis added].
41. Ibid.
42. John Boughey, The Elements of Military Administration and Military Law, 5th ed (William
Webb, 1880) at 99.
43. An Act for punishing Officers or Soldiers who shall Mutiny or Desert Their Majestyes Service
(UK), 1689, 1 Will & Mar, c 5, cited in ibid at 100.
44. Supra note 30, s 60.
45. See Généreux, supra note 3 at paras 68-69. But see National Defence Act, supra note 30,
s 70 (certain very serious offences, such as murder, cannot be tried in the military justice
system at all).
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cannot be tried by court martial, and a summary trial is obligatory.46 For all other
offences, the accused has the right to elect for a court martial.47
When compared to a summary trial, a court martial is an exercise of greater
formality with additional procedural safeguards, such as more stringent rules of
evidence.48 In practice, the vast majority of breaches are charged as one of the
five minor offences in order to guarantee proceeding by summary trial.49 Yet even
where the right to a court martial is offered, accused service members frequently
feel pressured against electing for one.50 The convention of trying certain offences
exclusively by summary trial has deep historical roots. The five minor offences
that can only be tried summarily were enumerated in the English Army Discipline
and Regulation Act of 1879.51
The core of Frontline Justice is Lévesque’s meticulous, clear, and cogent analysis
of the ways in which summary trials breach the Charter. Some arguments were
already well-known, while others are novel.52 Firstly, he argues that “the weakest
point of the current system” is the lack of independent adjudicators.53 As presiding
officers are members of the executive branch, lacking in both financial security and
security of tenure, the accused’s right to an independent and impartial tribunal is
breached.54 Secondly, the lack of transcript undermines the notion of a fair and
transparent process.55 Specifically, it “diminishes offenders’ ability to fully know
46. See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 49; QR&O, supra note 7, art 108.17; National Defence Act,
supra note 30, ss 85, 86, 90, 97, 129. Lévesque notes:
A ‘minor offence’ is an offence contrary to one of five sections of the National Defence Act,
namely section 85 (“Insubordinate Behaviour”), section 86 (“Quarrels and Disturbances”),
section 90 (“Absence Without Leave”), section 97 (“Drunkenness”), and section 129
(“Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline”), but only where the offence relates
to military training, maintenance of personal equipment, quarters or work space, or dress and
deportment. In the military legal community, those ‘minor offences’ are colloquially known as
the ‘baby five’ (Supra note 1 at 49).

47. See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 49; QR&O, supra note 7, art 108.17; National Defence Act,
supra note 30, s 162.1.
48. See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 89-90.
49. Ibid at 49.
50. Ibid at 148-49. See Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report of the Director
of Defence Counsel Services, by Delano Fullerton (DDCS, 2014) at para 19.
51. See National Defence Act, supra note 30, ss 85, 86, 90, 97, 129; Army Discipline and
Regulation Act 1879 (UK), 42 & 43 Vict, ss 10(2), 11, 15, 19, 40, reprinted in Boughey,
supra note 42 at 111.
52. See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 30.
53. Ibid at 73.
54. Ibid at 72, 162. See Charter, supra note 15, s 11(d).
55. See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 82.
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the case they have to meet for review, impeding their right to make a full answer
and defence.”56 Thirdly, as summary trial is not available to high-ranking officers,
they must face trial by court martial regardless of the severity of the offence.57
This “substantive inequality” results in structural differential treatment based on
rank58—a characteristic “difficult to change, or changeable only at unacceptable
personal cost”59—and violates the Charter.60 Fourthly, the accused person “does
not have a right to be represented by legal counsel at a summary trial,” breaching
their right to a fair trial.61 In sum, joining the Armed Forces entails voluntary
assumption of risk, but Lévesque argues that this commitment “is not a carte
blanche to water down [service members’] basic legal rights.”62
The tension between fair justice and prompt discipline weaves through the
book and throughout legal history. For example, in the case of prison discipline,
where the need for swiftness is also high, Lord Denning found that allowing
an accused inmate legal representation would result in unacceptable delays.63
To balance this tension, Lévesque employs a full Oakes analysis to determine if these
Charter breaches are saved by section one.64 At the first stage, he concludes that
the societal concern for swift military discipline—and national security—is both
pressing and substantial.65 However, at the second stage, he argues that summary
trials limit the rights of service members using means that are neither rationally
connected to the objective of military discipline nor minimally impairing nor
proportionate.66 The prose of Lévesque’s Oakes analysis is sufficiently technical
for a court’s reasons for judgment but is also accessible to a broader audience.
As part of his argument for reform, Lévesque compares and evaluates the
available alternatives that serve both discipline and justice.67 First, he reviews
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Ibid at 83, 162. See Charter, supra note 15, ss 7, 11(d).
I.e., colonels and generals. See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 47.
Ibid at 85.
Ibid at 87, citing Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR
203 at para 60.
See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 85, 95, 163; Charter, supra note 15, s 15.
Lévesque, supra note 1 at 96, 162; QR&O, supra note 7, art 108.14 (note B); Charter, supra
note 15, ss 7, 11(d).
Supra note 1 at 153.
Ibid at 98-99. See Fraser v Mudge [1975] 1 WLR 1132 at 1133-34, cited in Howard
v Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony Mountain Institution,
[1984] 2 FC 642.
See “Can Breaches Be Demonstrably Justified under Section 1?” in Lévesque, supra note 1,
132; Charter, supra note 15, s 1; R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 134.
Ibid at 137-38, 143.
“Reasonably Available Alternatives” in ibid, 111.
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methods for maintaining discipline in police forces and prisons in Canada.68
Second, he examines the approaches taken by other common law military
jurisdictions. These approaches include “judicialization,” which strengthens
procedural safeguards; “depenalization,” which removes penal punishments;
and hybrid approaches, which combine elements of the two.69 In each case,
he carefully weighs the advantages and disadvantages but concludes that the
alternatives have “struck a better balance between protecting individual rights
and maintaining discipline.”70 Through these chapters, his study of the legal
principles is analytically exhaustive and persuasive.
Lévesque argues for a new model of military justice—a balanced equilibrium
capable of meeting three separate needs: “political control, human rights, and
operational needs.”71 The centrepiece of Frontline Justice is Lévesque’s set of
detailed recommendations to remedy Charter breaches. Of the necessary changes,
he recommends: (1) to “remove ordinary offences from summary jurisdiction,”
(2) to “state that summary trials do not create criminal offences,” (3) to “record
summary proceedings,” (4) to “eliminate rank-based distinction,” (5) to “create
a right of appeal to Summary Appeal Court Martial,” (6) to “make election an
unequivocal waiver of rights,” and (7) to “give [the accused] meaningful access
to legal advice.”72
Lévesque’s call for change joins a chorus. In 1986—the early post-Charter
era—David J. Corry remarked that “if constitutional rights are to mean
anything at all, military regulations should not be upheld when they infringe
these rights.”73 In 1994, Janet Walker predicted that “[e]volving standards for
procedural fairness…will undoubtedly form the basis for fresh challenges to the
military justice system” and reasoned that service members who defend the rule
of law are entitled to its benefit as much as any other citizen.74 More recently,
in 2016, Michel W. Drapeau and Joshua M. Juneau decried summary trials as an
unfair “anachronism of a bygone era” and called for immediate reforms.75
After decades of relative stagnation in the military justice system, Bill C-77
became law in 2019.76 This new legislation entirely reformed the summary

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Ibid at 112, 117.
Ibid at 120, 123, 126.
Ibid at 130.
Ibid at 28.
Ibid at 163-70.
“Military Law under the Charter” (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall LJ 67 at 111.
“Military Justice: From Oxymoron to Aspiration” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 3, 32.
“Summary trials: remain unchanged in more than 300 years” (2016) 23 Esprit de
Corps 46 at 46.
76. Supra note 31.
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trial system by, inter alia, abandoning its criminal and penal aspects.77 This
depenalization approach replaces “trials” with “hearings” where the burden
of proof is the civil standard instead of the criminal standard.78 Instead of
penal punishments, service members may receive “service infractions.”79 Most
significantly, this “removes detention from [the] commanders’ toolbox” when
dealing with undisciplined service members.80 However, even without the
possibility of the deprivation of liberty, service members may still face lasting
consequences including reduction of rank and punitive financial measures.81
Lévesque argues that summary trials “are at a crossroads” and that
Parliament’s approach in Bill C-77 was flawed.82 While depenalization dodges
constitutional issues, it provides no clarity regarding the legal rights of service
members.83 Crucially, key issues relating to “transcript, legal representation, and
judicial oversight” remain unaddressed.84 For multiple reasons, Lévesque favours
a judicialization approach.85 In particular, he argues that “it represents more of an
evolution based on our military tradition and less of a paradigm shift.”86 Lévesque
anticipates legal challenges and urges observers to review how the reforms are
implemented through regulations.87
In Frontline Justice, Lévesque considered it his duty to contribute to
improving the military justice system, a system that must balance discipline and
justice and operate even during extraordinary times, including during war and
large-scale conflicts.88 He succeeds. Lévesque connects a solid and compelling case
for reform with a wide audience. Former Judge Advocate General Major-General
Blaise Cathcart remarked that “the military justice system must always fiercely
promote and protect the very democratic values and the rule of law that our
men and women in uniform willingly put themselves in harm’s way and are
willing to die for.”89 Lévesque champions the view that our service members
deserve nothing less.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Lévesque, supra note 1 at 154.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 155.
Ibid at 183.
Ibid at 182.
Ibid at 161.
Ibid at 161-62.
Ibid at 31, 156.
Ibid at 183.
Ibid.
Ibid at 144, 152, 155. See also Généreux, supra note 3 at para 60.
Lévesque, supra note 1 at 153, citing BB Cathcart, “Speaking Notes for MGen/mgén B.B.
Cathcart” (Military Law Conference delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa,
13 November 2015) at 9.

